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Session 13
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
The George Washington University
David J. Berteau
President & CEO
The Professional Services Council
I.	OFF TO A ROCKY START.
In retrospect, 2018 would have been a good year to get out of the prediction market. Simply, nothing
we experienced in 2017 or 2018 makes us terribly confident in predicting what is in store for 2019 and
beyond. We’re hard pressed to recall starting a calendar year with a similar sense of trepidation and
uncertainty with regard to what to expect on Pennsylvania Avenue, from the White House to the Capitol.
We’re increasingly sympathetic to those who, over the last couple of years, have found the rapidly spinning
news cycle exhausting, overwhelming, and stressful. It’s not an environment that suggests, going forward,
we should expect stable leadership and staffing, reliable appropriations and program funding, comfortable
contractual relationships, and proactive, meaningful, efficient long-term reform. All of which only increases
anxiety in the government contracting policy and practice spheres, because uncertainty and instability
threaten or undercut, among other things, efforts to engage in effective tradeoff analyses and planning,
making efficient, long-term investment decisions, maintaining healthy contractual relationships, proactively
investing in hiring, developing, and training personnel (needed today and in the future), while, instead,
permitting a regressive overemphasis on cost savings rather than focusing on programmatic outcomes
as a principal goal of the acquisition process. None of which is a cause for optimism. On a more positive
note, many agencies enjoyed an agreement on funding and full year appropriations, which led, in turn,
to increases in contract obligations for FY18. (More on this below.) In addition, the backlog in security
clearance background investigations finally began to decline, falling by more than 100,000 by year’s end.
II.

A PARTIAL SHUTDOWN: EARLY APPROPRIATIONS SUCCESSES FAIL TO AVOID
END-OF-THE-CALENDAR YEAR INSTABILITY.

In a year when the Defense Department appropriation and a number of others (Energy and Water
Development; Labor, Health & Human Services, Education; Legislative Branch; Military Construction, and
Veterans Affairs) were passed in a timely manner, we could be forgiven if we had not expected a(nother)
government shut-down, albeit a partial one. (It had been more than a decade since DoD, and more than 15
years since the other agencies, began the fiscal year with full year appropriations.) The current impasse
and (again, partial) shut-down commenced with the expiration of continuing resolutions (CR’s) on December 21, 2018 – animated by the Administration’s demand for (generally) $5 billion for construction of the
Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol Southern border wall and power-shift in
(and surge of energy from) the Democratic-majority House of Representatives.
Time will tell how disruptive this shutdown becomes. While all signs indicate that this shut-down
may achieve historical significance in terms of longevity, its impact is, at least somewhat, tempered by its
limited scope. Conversely, nothing about suspending/interrupting government functions bodes well, and
the impact on the public, the economy, civil servants, and, of course, contractor personnel are unfortunate
and, sadly, largely avoidable. Of course, no one “wins” in a government shutdown, and federal contractors
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are often the biggest losers. That’s a shame, to the extent that federal contractors play an essential role in helping agencies achieve their missions and
deliver services to the American people. And, of course, the longer a shutdown
lasts, the greater the cost to the public, the economy, and federal agencies.
III.	OPAQUE GROWTH BELOW THE RADAR: HIGH VOLUME,
LOWER DOLLAR PROCUREMENTS: THE NEW
THRESHOLDS AND SCHEDULE CONSOLIDATION
A. Micro-purchase and simplified acquisition thresholds. Looking back, one of last year’s most dramatic policy and practice changes – in
terms of impacting the broadest segment of the acquisition community and
the private sector – will fly largely under the radar, … and that’s the whole
point. Pursuant to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
Section 821, the micro-purchase threshold experienced a dramatic, greaterthan-inflation-adjusted, bump up to $10,000 for all agencies (including DoD).
Congress Passes FY 2019 NDAA, 60 GC ¶ 241. (Although, as the end of
Calendar Year 2018 approached, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
had not yet been amended to reflect that increase, DoD raised the threshold
by class deviation on August 31, 2018.) But the longstanding $2,000 cap on
construction – tied to the Davis-Bacon Act, which has never been indexed –
remains. The micro-purchase threshold for contingencies, emergencies, and
major disasters is now $20,000 (domestic) and $30,000 (for work outside the
U.S.) See https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA00226018-DPC.pdf. We’ve come a long way since the late 1990’s, when the micropurchase authority was established, as part of the reform and streamlining
movement, and dramatically expanded reliance on the Governmentwide
commercial purchase card (yes, the then-nascent Government charge card).
DoD Gears Up for Simplified Micropurchases, 40 GC ¶ 192.
Meanwhile, the simplified acquisition threshold increased Government-wide from $150,000 (which has been inflation adjusted) to $250,000. For
contingencies, emergencies, and major disasters, the limit is now $750,000
(domestic) and $1.5 million (for work outside the U.S.), with a $500,000 threshold for humanitarian and peace-keeping procurements outside the U.S. The
government has yet to take full advantage of this increase, and agencies and
contractors would do well to push for reliance on this flexibility.
Experience suggests there will be problems, but they’ll also largely occur below the radar screen. Arguably, that’s the whole point: out of sight,
out of mind. From a policy perspective, Congress is betting, and we tend to
agree, that reduced transactions costs for massive numbers of transactions
will more than offset any losses, higher prices, fraud, and abuse facilitated
by the streamlined approach and reduced oversight associated with micropurchases and simplified acquisitions. By analogy, see, e.g., GSA Travel
Card Program Needs Better Oversight, IG Says, 60 GC ¶ 301 (IG found that,
although cardholders were using their travel cards inappropriately, supervisors did not receive the questionable charges reports in a timely manner, and
cardholders continued to make inappropriate charges undetected); Developments In Brief(a): DOD IG Finds Incomplete Purchase Card Reports to OMB,
60 GC ¶ 126, DODIG-2018-101, DoD Reporting of Charge Card Misuse to
OMB, available at media.defense.gov/2018/Apr/09/2001900779/-1/-1/1/
DODIG-2018-101.PDF. See also, CIGIE Finds High-Risk Transactions Using
Purchase Cards, 60 GC ¶ 216 (Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (CIGIE) randomly sampled 1,255 of 1.8 million transactions
totaling over $941 million from 2016-2017, and found that 40 percent did not
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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comply with applicable policies in the following major risk categories: split
transactions, sales tax transactions, transactions from unauthorized thirdparty merchants, and transactions from prohibited and questions merchant
category codes (MCCs)), available at www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/
oig-reports/CIGIE_Purchase_Card_Initiative_Report_July_2018.pdf.
B. Consolidating the GSA Schedules. On a more observably dramatic
note, in late November, GSA announced that it will consolidate its 24 Multiple
Award Schedules (MAS) into one single Schedule for both products and services.
GSA Administrator, Emily Murphy, explained that this responds to government
and business partner feedbacl. “Reforming our schedules will improve customer
service, make it easier for small businesses to access the schedules program,
reduce duplication for all our vendors, and allows GSA’s workforce to focus on
delivering solutions….” GSA Announces Transformation of Multiple Awards
Schedules, https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/gsaannounces-transformation-of-multiple-awards-schedules. See also, 60 ¶ 366(a).
Federal Acquisition Service Commissioner Alan Thomas explained that the
consolidation will “provide a single entry point to MAS with consistent practices
applied across the program and save vendors from the burden of managing
contracts on multiple schedules.” At a minimum, it will be interesting to watch
how the community progresses up the learning curve and, among other things,
adapts its vocabulary to the new regime. (Our sense is that the familiar “Schedule 70” is as ingrained in the information technology (IT) lexicon as, say, “1102”
is among government contracting professionals.) On a related note, see GSA
Needs To Refine Transactional Data Metrics For MAS Pilot, 60 GC ¶ 230; see
also Audit of Transactional Data Reporting Pilot Evaluation Plan and Metrics,
available at www.gsaig.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/A140143_2.pdf.
Readers may also be interested in GSA Interact’s “Multiple Award Schedules”
blog, at https://interact.gsa.gov/groups/multiple-award-schedules. See also,
MAS Vendors Need Guidance, Training On OLM Authority, Industry Group
Says, 60 GC ¶ 127 (Coalition for Government Procurement urged GSA to issue guidance and provide training on the new authority to procure order-level
materials on MAS task and delivery orders); GSAR Final Rule Allows OrderLevel Materials On MAS Orders, 60 GC ¶ 29, 83 Fed. Reg. 3275 (Jan. 24, 2018),
after multiple rounds of comments to the original 2016 proposed rule, 81 Fed.
Reg. 62445 (Sept. 9, 2016) (requiring, inter alia, three quotes for orders above
the simplified acquisition threshold).
IV.	NOW “ACTING”: CHURNING AT THE TOP, VACANCIES,
CONTINUED TRANSITIONS.
Two years into the current administration, and we’re still not fully accustomed to the vacancy and turnover rates in high level (e.g., up to, and
including, cabinet level), politically-appointed leadership. And nothing suggests that 2019 will bring a wave of nominations to fill critical positions with
highly qualified individuals committed to serving in specific capacities for
lengthy periods of time.
Still Waiting at OFPP. We would be remiss if we did not take this
(now annual) opportunity to remind readers that the current Administration has not nominated a candidate to serve as Administrator of the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). Given the number of vacancies and
acting appointments generally – and, most obviously, at high(er) levels, such
as Cabinet-level positions – we are no longer holding our breath. Given
the longstanding, demonstrated competence of the career staff to operate
without political leadership, we hesitate to elevate this to crisis level, but we
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consider it disappointing and consider it a squandered opportunity. Among
other things, because the OFPP Administrator is a leading face and voice for
the profession, the vacancy does not bode well the perception of procurement
process and the morale of the acquisition community.
Nor do we expect much focused leadership on procurement from elsewhere,
such as the higher levels within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), where leadership is on the move and wearing multiple hats. OMB
Director Mick Mulvaney already was spending half his time simultaneously
running the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the OMB’s
deputy director, Margaret Weichert, was tapped to also run the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Then, in December, the President announced
that Mulvaney would serve as acting White House chief of staff. Russell T.
Vought was quickly elevated to acting OMB director, though an official announcement has not yet been made. Maybe the partial shutdown will offer
OMB acting director Vought an opportunity to settle in his new role. Contrast
this with what appears to be vigorous and knowledgeable procurement leadership elsewhere in government, including GSA, where Emily Murphy has
taken significant steps (see the discussion of schedule consolidation, above).
Changing of the Guard at DoD: We assume we were not alone in failing to anticipate that the resignation of Secretary of Defense James Mattis
would make way for Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan to serve as
– for now – Acting Secretary of Defense. (Of course, this is not unprecedented;
the last time the deputy secretary served a lengthy period was 1989, when
William Howard Taft IV held the position for two months.) Meanwhile, at
DPAC/DPAP, Shay Assad is returning to his position as Director for Pricing
and Contracting Initiatives, and Kim Herrington is currently serving as the
Acting Principal Director for Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPC). In a
bizarre and unrelated twist, earlier in the year, on August 21, DPAP alerted
the public of a potential scam, that an individual may be impersonating Shay
Assad by email and/or telephone in an attempt to obtain software/equipment/
etc. Truth is stranger than fiction.
V.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION: A FRESH START, DISAGGREGATION
(OR WHEN “OTHER” BECOMES THE NORM), AND TRYING
TO MAKE SENSE OF IT ALL

A. The Section 809 Panel. By the time this conference begins, we’ll
have had an opportunity to see, and, hopefully, digest, the final Section 809
Panel report, scheduled for “the big reveal” in mid-January. (Recall that NDAA
Section 809 for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, required the Secretary
of Defense to establish an advisory panel on streamlining and codifying
acquisition regulations. The massive study panel has been working on five
target areas: (1) establishing and administering appropriate buyer and seller
relationships; (2) improving the functioning of the system; (3) ensuring the
continuing financial and ethical integrity of defense procurement programs;
(4) protecting the best interests of DoD; and (5) eliminating any regulations
that are unnecessary for the purposes described.) See generally, https://
section809panel.org. Among other things, we’ll be curious to see what the
809 panel recommends with regard to reining in bid protests. ABA Section
Criticizes 809 Panel’s Proposals To Limit Bid Protests; 60 GC ¶ 167; RAND
Study Finds More DOD Protests, But No Flood Of Frivolous Protests, 60 GC
¶ 18; Steven L. Schooner, Bid Protests: The RAND Study Of DOD Protests At
The GAO And The COFC, 32 N&CR ¶ 10 (February 2018); Christopher Yukins
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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and Daniel Ramish, Feature Comment: Section 809 And ‘e-Portal’ Proposals,
By Cutting Bid Protests In Federal Procurement, Could Breach International
Agreements And Raise New Risks Of Corruption, 60 GC ¶ 138; CRS Surveys
Bid Protest Forum Distinctions, 60 GC ¶ 299; David H. Carpenter & Moshe
Schwartz, Government Contract Bid Protests: Analysis of Legal Processes
and Recent Developments (R45080, November 28, 2018) (“Congress might
utilize the information gained from … studies, reports, and pilot programs
to inform its consideration of substantive legislative reforms to the bid protest system[, … including] implementation of certain recommendations in
the RAND report or making permanent, expanding, or eliminating the pilot
program that requires certain contractors to reimburse the government for
the costs associated with adjudicating unsuccessful protests.”), available at
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45080.
Among other things, we’re curious to see if and how the 809 Panel report
addresses the concern that, increasingly, the FAR and DoD’s Procedures,
Guidance, and Information (PGI) don’t accurately reflect practice in
the field. For example, in a recent report, GAO explained that orders under
indefinite-delivery contracts comprised roughly 40 percent of DoD obligations
in fiscal years 2015 through 2017. In that context, we find it remarkable how
inadequately the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) describes the process
through which 40 percent of DoD’s acquisition spending flows. For example,
GAO notes that, despite FAR 16.500(a)’s established preference for multiple
awards, “[o]f the DOD awards for the indefinite-delivery /indefinite-quantity
(IDIQ) contract type during this period, about three-quarters were made to
a single contractor, rather than multiple contractors.” Indeed, Table 1 suggests that GAO under-stated the single-award trend; the Table’s numbers of
transactions indicated that single award IDIQ’s represented 79 percent of all
DoD IDIQ’s in 2015, 78 percent in 2016, and a whopping 85 percent in 2017.
(For FY17, that’s 6,242 single-award indefinite-delivery contracts (that were
competed), 2,069 single-award indefinite-delivery contracts (that were not
competed), and only 1,423 multiple-award indefinite-delivery contracts.) If
85 percent of DoD’s IDIQ’s in FY 2017 were single awards, the policy favoring
multiple awards is teetering on the verge of dead letter. See, e.g., Steven L.
Schooner, Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts: Time To Correlate
Practice And Policy?, 32 N&CR ¶ 44 (September 2018); GAO-18-412R, Defense
Contracting: Use by the Department of Defense of Indefinite-Delivery Contracts
from Fiscal Years 2015 through 2017, (May 10, 2018), available at https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-412R. See also, Navy Not Preparing D&Fs
For IDIQ Contracts, IG Says, 60 GC ¶ 45 (This appears to be largely a technical/compliance failure, rather than an omission: the D&Fs reviewed were
incomplete, lacking the necessary rationales.), see DODIG-2018-069, Navy’s
Single Award Indefinite-Delivery Indefinite Quantity Contracts, available at
media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/05/2001873543/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-069.
PDF; Section 809 Panel Seeks To Streamline DOD Commercial Buying, 60 GC
¶ 46 (among other things, we’re pleased to see that the report says: “Rather
than focusing on price and process to measures success, [DOD’s] acquisition
system should focus on outcomes....”).
B. The Section 813 Panel. Meanwhile, the 813 Government-industry
advisory panel, established in the FY 2016 NDAA § 813 (as amended by FY
2017 NDAA § 809(f)(1)), completed its review 10 USCA §§ 2320 and 2321,
regarding rights in technical data and their implementing regulations. See,
2018 Report: Government-Industry Advisory Panel on Technical Data Rights
(November 13, 2018), available at http://www.ndia.org/-media/Sites/NDIA/
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Policy/Documents/Final%20Section%20813%20Report. The report’s analysis
is built around a host of topics, including the business model, acquisition planning and requirements, source selection and post source selection, IP licensing,
balancing the interests of the parties, implementation, compliance/administrative, data acquisition, and modular open systems approaches (MOSA).
While the panel seemed united in agreeing that DoD acquisition professionals require more training in intellectual property right-related procurement
issues, we are confident this will be addressed at greater length in Chapter
12 of these materials. See also, generally, Daniel J. Kelly, IP Rights Under
NASA and DoD “Other Transaction” Agreements - Inventions and Patents,
18-9 Briefing Papers (August 2018); W. Jay DeVecchio, Taking the Mystery
Out of Data Rights, 18-8 Briefing Papers (July 2018); Ralph C. Nash, Validation of Technical Data: Statutory Changes, 32 N&CR ¶ 49; Ralph C. Nash,
Postscript: Obtaining More Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software,
32 N&CR ¶ 38 (“We are seeing more protests concerning the efforts of the
military services to obtain sufficient information with accompanying rights
to reduce the cost of sustainment of their weapon systems without violating
the statutory prohibition of demanding such rights.”).
On December 7, 2018, on the heels of the final 813 Panel report, Army
Secretary Mark T. Esper issued Army Directive 2018-26, Enabling Modernization Through the Management of Intellectual Property, with a stated goal is
reducing life cycle cost for Army programs, and focused on the Army buying
“just enough” IP. See https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/
pdf/web/ARN14261_AD2018_26_Final.pdf. With the decentralization of
program acquisition from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to
the Military Departments, this directive applies only to the Army. However,
USD(A&S) Ellen Lord has indicated that her team is working on a DoD-wide
IP policy, which has yet to be provided for review and comment.
C. DoD Progress Payments Dust-up Resolved (Or Deferred). For
now, DoD’s controversial (dare we say “incendiary”?) proposal to lower the
progress payment rate and performance-based payment rate has been derailed. Following a September 21, 2018 letter from the chairs of the House
and Senate Armed Services committees, Representative Mac Thornberry
(R-TX) and Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK), then-Deputy Secretary of Defense
Patrick Shanahan called the proposal “fundamentally flawed,” after which,
on October 1, the proposed rule was withdrawn. See also, Industry Decries
DFARS Proposed Rule On Performance-Based Payments, Progress Payments,
60 GC ¶ 305 (Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA),
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), and Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) and the Professional Services Council (PSD) urged DOD to
allow for “a more fulsome discussion” of the DFARS proposed rule); Industry
Group Opposes DFARS Performance-Based Payment Proposed Rule, 60 GC ¶
293; DOD Proposes DFARS Incentive Structure For Progress Payments And
Performance-Based Payments, 60 GC ¶ 276; 83 Fed. Reg. 42831 (Aug. 24,
2018). See PSC’s comments at www.pscouncil.org/Downloads/documents/
Advocacy-Policy Docs/Progress Payments 9.14.18 Public Meeting Statement
(FINAL).pdf. Stay tuned, however: in December, USD(A&S) Lord indicated
that the issue may return, but that DoD would more proactively involve industry in crafting the rule.
D. Focus on PALT. Section 886 of the FY18 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to develop, make available for public comment, and finalize a
DoD-wide definition of the term “Procurement Administrative Lead Time” or
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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“PALT.” See DARS-2018-0005, 83 Fed. Reg. 5762 (February 9, 2018). DoD is
proposing to define PALT as “the time between the date on which the initial
solicitation for a contract or task order of the Department of Defense is issued
and the date of the award of the contract or task order.” DoD plans to use
Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to measure
and publicly disseminate PALT data. In a March 12, 2018 letter, the Council
on Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) supported harmonizing the definition of, and then tracking, PALT. CODSIA also suggested “that
buying activities should have the flexibility to track PALT at an earlier stage[,
which would …] not only aid buying activities in managing their acquisitions,
[but also] … provide greater opportunities for the Department to reduce the
time spent on such acquisitions. ... [Particularly] for complex information
technology or other services acquisitions, or major systems purchases, the
time between a requirements determination and solicitation may be the longer period in the acquisition lifecycle. Not only is this worth capturing and
reporting, it should be a principal focus of reduction efforts.” Letter available
at DARS-2018-0005 http://www.codsia.org/uploads/6/8/9/9/68991301/
codsia_comments_dars-2018-0005_-_palt_-_final_-_12_mar_18.pdf.
E. Transparency: Every Little Bit Helps. We’re also pleased to hear
that USD(A&S) Lord intends to promote transparency by restricting use of
“For Official Use Only” designations on various acquisition reports. (This
would be a breath of fresh air amidst an administration that has consistently
moved in the wrong direction on transparency.) See https://www.executivegov.
com/2019/01/ellen-lord-sets-plan-to-promote-pentagon-wide-acquisitiontransparency/.
F. The End of the LPTA Era? We applaud Congressional and DoD cognizance of, focus on, and commitment to, ending the scourge of over-reliance
on, and misuse of, lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) competitions.
The wheels on this are moving slowly, but, apparently, they’re still moving.
Comments on DOD’s proposed rule, available at 83 Fed. Reg. 62550 (December
4, 2018), are due in early February. As late as November, GAO bemoaned that
the FY17 NDAA, Section 813, “mandated that DOD revise its regulations to
require that eight criteria be considered when using the LPTA process. As
of September 2018, DOD had not yet done so.” The eight criteria (including
the two added in the FY18 NDAA) that that DOD contracting officers must
ensure before issuing a solicitation on an LPTA basis are:
•

DOD can clearly describe the minimum requirements in terms
of performance objectives, measures, and standards that will be
used to determine acceptability of offers.

•

DOD would realize no, or little, value from a proposal exceeding
the solicitation’s minimum technical requirements.

•

The proposed technical approaches can be evaluated with little
or no subjectivity as to the desirability of one versus the other.

•

There is a high degree of certainty that a review of technical proposals other than that of the lowest-price offeror would not identify
factors that could provide other benefits to the government.

•

The contracting officer has included a justification for the use of
the LPTA process in the contract file.

•

The lowest price reflects full life-cycle costs, including for operations and support. (We’re ecstatic to see life-cycling costing gain
increased visibility.)
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•

DOD would realize little or no additional innovation or future
technological advantage by using a different methodology.

•

For the acquisition of goods, the goods being purchased are predominantly expendable in nature, nontechnical, or have a short
life expectancy or shelf life.

GAO also recommended that the DFARS should clarify how officials should
apply the criteria that goods be expendable, nontechnical or short-lived, and
that the lowest price reflects full life-cycle costs. “Absent additional direction,
contracting officials across DOD may not understand how to consistently apply these criteria when using the LPTA process,” GAO cautioned.
See DOD Should Clarify Statutory LPTA Criteria, 60 GC ¶ 357, GAO-1954, Defense Contracting: DOD Should Clarify Criteria for Using Lowest Price
Technically Acceptable Process (November 2018) (“GAO estimates that about
26 percent of [DoD’s FY2017] contracts and orders valued $5 million and above
… were competitively awarded using the …[LPTA] process.”), available at
www.gao.gov/assets/700/695352.pdf. See also, David Berteau, PSC Letter
to Kevin Fahey (November 20, 2018), expressing serious concerns regarding
DoD’s continued delay of overdue and statutorily mandated regulations restricting the use of LPTA source selection criteria for DoD services contracts.
While PSC acknowledges a place for LPTA, when used appropriately, “applying LPTA to complex professional or IT services where higher-level technical
capabilities and innovation are often sought, and where the contracting requirements are often difficult to accurately define, is particularly ill-advised.”
PSC also notes that “[e]xcluding task orders from the LPTA restrictions would
be inconsistent with the procurement and acquisition definitions contained
in the [FAR] and with the Congressional intent behind [NDAA] Section 813.”
Available at https://www.pscouncil.org/.
G. A Resurgence for Other Transactions (OT’s) and Experimental
Authorities? Congress continues to signal its support for flexibility, creativity, innovation, and working around the existing framework for many types
of projects. The big news last year was USD(A&S) Lord issuing a new – and
dramatically different – Other Transactions (OT) Guide, available at https://
aaf.dau.mil/ot-guide. (The Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects
(version 1.2.0, January 2017) was rescinded in its entirety and replaced by
this guide.) In describing the purpose of other transactions (OT’s), the guide
explains that:
The OT authorities were created to give DoD the flexibility necessary to
adopt and incorporate business practices that reflect commercial industry
standards and best practices into its award instruments. When leveraged
appropriately, OTs provide the Government with access to state-of-the-art
technology solutions from traditional and Non-Traditional Defense Contractors, through a multitude of potential teaming arrangements tailored to the
particular project and the needs of the participants.
We appreciate the fact that the guide was “intended for two primary audiences, both the Government team, to include Project Managers, Agreements
Officers (AOs), Agreements Specialists, Systems Engineers, Small Business
representatives, Legal Counsel; and Government partners, to include Industry, Academia, other Federal agencies, and State and Local authorities ….”
The guide stakes out some boundaries early on, emphasizing that OTs are
not FAR-based procurement contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, or
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs). Conversely,
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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OT’s may help DoD:
•

Foster new relationships and practices involving traditional and
nontraditional defense contractor (or NDCs), especially those
that may not be interested in doing FAR based contracts with the
Government

•

Broaden the industrial base available to Government

•

Support dual-use projects

•

Encourage flexible, quicker, and cheaper project design and execution

•

Leverage commercial industry investment in technology development and to partner with industry to ensure DoD requirements
are included in future technologies and products

•

Collaborate in innovative arrangements

After a brief overview, the guide proceeds in three parts: (1) Planning; (2)
Publicizing, Soliciting, and Evaluating (concluding, basically, with award); and
(3) Administration (or what we might call post-award contract, agreement, or
relationship management). Weighing in at approximately 125 pages (in the
PDF version), the online resource is informative and exhaustive, yet surprisingly accessible, containing, among other things, case studies, a glossary, and
a chronological history of statutory authority. Notably missing from this list
(and the guide itself) is the absence of consideration of life-cycle costs and
sustainment planning for “prototypes” obtained via OT agreements; and there
is no sign that DoD, other agencies, or the Congress is ready to address this
significant shortcoming.
Our favorite appendix contains the Common OT Myths and Facts. (It
should come as no surprise that the guide refutes all of the following “myths”
as “false,” and follows with brief explanations:
1.

There is only one type of OT available to DoD.

2.

The OT authorities are new and are rarely used.

3.

Since an OT is termed an “agreement,” it is not a contract.

4.

Since CICA does not apply, competition and fairness are not considered.

5.

OTs Cannot be Protested.

6.

None of the federal statutes or regulations apply to OTs.

7.

OTs can only be awarded through a consortium.

8.

The OT authorities can only use RDT&E appropriations.

9.

Anyone in DoD can award an OT.

10. OTs will always be faster to award than other contractual instruments.
See also, DOD A&S Undersecretary Issues ‘Other Transactions’ Guidance,
60 GC ¶ 365; Richard L. Dunn, Feature Comment: DOD Other Transactions
Guide—A Breath Of Fresh Air, 60 GC ¶ 362 (“The new Guide makes it clear
that it is truly a guide in several ways. Its lay-out and style are a complete
departure from the prior Guide and cannot be mistaken for a regulation. It
contains highlighted case studies, a glossary of definitions, and a collection
of common misunderstandings and myths….”). We also applaud DoD’s guid-
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ance that requires that “Other transactions” agreements (OTAs) for prototypes must be reported in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).
See 60 GC ¶ 292(c); available at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/
USA002363-18-DPC.pdf. See also, Richard L. Dunn, Practitioner’s Comment:
GAO Sustains OTA Protest, 60 GC ¶ 195 (discussing Oracle Am., Inc., Comp.
Gen. Dec. B-416061, 2018 CPD ¶ 180, finding that a follow-on production
OTA was improper because (1) the initial prototype OT did not include a
provision for a follow-on OT, and (2) the underlying prototype OT was not
completed; Dunn asserts that GAO’s ‘business as usual’ approach to OT’s “is
clearly wrong and harmful” to the overall reform effort. It is instructive to
note, however, that DoD raised no public objection to GAO’ precedent-setting
decision.); Vernon J. Edwards, Sad Commentary: Rules, Or The Lack Thereof,
Won’t Make Acquisition Agile And Innovative, 33 N&CR ¶ 5; Richard L.
Dunn, Other Transaction Agreements: What Applies?, 32 N&CR ¶ 22 Ralph
C. Nash, Other Transactions: A Preferred Technique?, 32 N&CR ¶ 8 (“Does
additional complexity produce better outcomes? It will be interesting to find
out.”); Armani Vadiee and Todd M. Garland, The Federal Government’s “Other
Transaction” Authority, 18-5 Briefing Papers (April 2018).
H. The State of the Industrial Base. We’ve previously bemoaned –
throughout much of the prior administration’s Better Buying Power (BBP)
initiative, with its apparent prioritization of reducing contractor profits and
overhead expenses, including independent research and development – the
lack of attention paid to DoD’s industrial base. Industrial base issues are
surely to be invigorated by the 140-page report of the interagency task force
established pursuant to Executive Order 13806 (82 Fed. Reg. 34597 (July
26, 2017)).
We also continue to be frustrated that neither the Executive Order nor
the report addresses the business base that provides half of all contract support for national security, via contracts for services and solutions rather than
products. The vulnerabilities in logistics, sustainment, and support services
are likely to be at least as widespread as those in the component supply chain,
but the lack of attention to those vulnerabilities means too little is known
about them and, accordingly, too little is being done to address them. To date,
neither DoD nor the White House has publicly acknowledged these problems.
Notwithstanding that shortcoming, the study sets a valued benchmark and
provides for needed actions. Three of the major findings animate much of
what follows, and none are surprising:
•

A surprising level of foreign dependence on competitor nations
exists;

•

Workforce challenges face employers across all sectors; and

•

Many sectors continue to move critical capabilities offshore in
pursuit of competitive pricing and access to foreign markets.

We found that the other major finding was potentially the most sophisticated and under-appreciated: the task force articulated that impacts and
risks primarily affect “sub-tiers” of the supply chains, rather than the major
(or top-tier, or name brand, or conventional) prime contractors. The report
then identifies “five macro forces driving risk” into the industrial base:
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sequestration and uncertainty of U.S. Government spending;

2.

decline of U.S. manufacturing capabilities and capacity;

3.

deleterious U.S. Government business and procurement practices;
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4.

industrial policies of competitor nations; and

5.

diminishing U.S. STEM and trade skills.

That’s a daunting list. The report then turns to “ten risk archetypes” that
threaten the manufacturing and industrial base: sole source, single source,
fragile source, fragile market, capacity constrained supply market, foreign
dependency, diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages,
gaps in U.S.-based human capital, erosion of U.S.-based infrastructure, and
product security. For better or worse, the report includes a dizzying array of
recommendations – large and small – at four levels: investment, policy, regulation, and legislation. Looking at the list – with recommendations ranging
from the practical (reducing the personnel security clearance backlog through
more efficient processes) to the aspirational (accelerating workforce development efforts to grow domestic science, technology, engineering, mathematics
(STEM), and critical trade skills) – offers a stark insight into the long-term
challenges faced in maintaining, let alone enhancing, the industrial base. We
also expect readers will be particularly interested in the “sector summaries,”
subdivided into traditional defense sectors (think aircraft, munitions, shipbuilding, nuclear, space, and “soldier systems”) and “cross-cutting” sectors
(such as machine tooling, materials – both raw and downstream, electronics,
software, and, of course, cybersecurity). See, Assessing and Strengthening the
Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency
of the United States (September 2018), available at defense.gov/StrengtheningDefenseIndustrialBase; see also, generally, DOD Task Force Delivers
EO-Mandated Defense Industrial Base Report To President, 60 GC ¶ 316;
DOD Faces Challenges Assessing Industrial Base Risks, 60 GC ¶ 197; GAO18-435, Defense Industrial Base: Integrating Existing Supplier Data and
Addressing Workforce Challenges Could Improve Risk Analysis, available at
www.gao.gov/assets/700/692458.pdf (risks to the industrial base include, for
example, suppliers’ financial viability, limited capacity, foreign dependence,
obsolete items, and loss of skills or equipment). See also, on a related note,
DOD Acquisitions Must Focus On Supply Chain Security, Nonprofit Says, 60
GC ¶ 251; Chris Nissen, John Gronager, Robert Metzger & Harvey Rishikof,,
Deliver Uncompromised: A Strategy for Supply Chain Security and Resilience
in Response to the Changing Character of War, available at www.mitre.org/
sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-2417-deliver-uncompromised-MITREstudy-8AUG2018.pdf (“DoD must make better use of its existing resources
to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from network and supply
chain threats…. While DoD cannot control all the actions of its numerous
information system and supply chain participants, it can lead by example
and use its purchasing power and regulatory authority to move companies to
work with DoD to enhance security through addressing threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences of its capabilities and adapt to dynamic, constantly
changing threats.”).
Bear in mind that the concept of “Deliver Uncompromised,” described
not only in the above report but also in DoD testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee last June, addresses the problem with emphasizing security in evaluation criteria for contracts, whether for supply chain or
services. That problem is the absence of any agreed-upon way of measuring
such security. We know how to measure cost, schedule, and (to a less welldefined degree) performance, but no one can say with confidence how to
measure security. Until we do, this will remain a tough nut to crack and a
hard problem to define, much less solve.
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I. Modern Tools: Ambrosia? Catnip for Defense Acquisition Geeks?
Touted as a “new digital tool suite for acquisition policy,” the Digital Acquisition Prototypes, developed by MITRE for USD(A&S) are, if nothing else, eyecatching, informative, and user-friendly. We encourage readers to visit the
site and engage with these interactive tools. To the extent that all defense
acquisition programs require two fundamental elements to execute: an acquisition pathway and a contracting strategy, the tools are intended to, among
other things assist organizations in selecting the pathway and strategy that
best meet their program’s needs in a way that complements and supports
positive program outcomes. The specific tools are an “adaptive acquisition
framework” and a “contracting cone.” DAU explains that, because there are
many pathways for DoD to deliver capabilities, the Adaptive Acquisition
Framework tool, see https://aaf.dau.mil/aaf/, helps you select the right
pathway and provides detailed guidance for each. The pathways to choose
from are:
•

Urgent Operational Needs

•

Middle Tier of Acquisition

•

Tailorable Traditional

•

Acquisition of Services

•

Defense Business Systems

The companion Contracting Cone, see https://aaf.dau.mil/contractingcone/, outlines the full spectrum of available FAR and Non-FAR contract
strategies. The supporting materials provide details about each strategy, to
enable collaborative discussions to select the right strategy based on environment, constraints, and desired outcomes. The goal is to provide visibility into
new or lesser known strategies – separated into following FAR-based and
non-FAR based – and ensure that the full range of contract (and contractlike) strategies are considered.
FAR Based Strategies:
•

Federal Supply Schedules – FAR Subpart 8.4

•

Commercial Items – FAR Part 12

•

Simplified Acquisitions – FAR Part 13

•

Contracting by Negotiation – FAR Part 15

•

Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) – FAR Subpart 16.5

•

Letter Contract (or undefinitized contractual agreement (UCA))
– FAR Section 16.603

•

Agreements -  written instruments of understanding containing
contract clauses (not an actual contract), applying to future contracts – FAR Subpart 16.7

•

Small Business – FAR Part 19

•

Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) – FAR Section 35.016

•

Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business
Technology Transfer (STTR)

•

Defense Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) Pilot Program

Non-FAR Based Strategies:
•
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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•

Procurement for Experimental Purposes (10 USCA §  2373)

•

Research and Development (R&D) Agreements, including Cooperative R&D Agreements (CRADA), Partnership Intermediary
Agreements (PIA), and Technology Investment Agreements (TIA)

The contracting cone (c’mon, it’s fun to say - try it!) also includes a handy
(if high level and conclusory) Contract Type Matrix, which maps the contract types that are allowed for each of the major strategies outlined in the
contracting cone.
J. Major System Performance Assessment: We were disappointed
that DoD does not appear to have continued publication of the annual assessments of the Defense Acquisition System, which were produced during
then-USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s leadership. This year, however, thanks to
GAO, we enjoyed a similarly data-rich gold mine of insights into DoD’s major
system acquisition performance. See, generally, Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks
To DOD Weapon Systems Portfolio, 60 GC ¶ 145, GAO-18-360SP, Weapon
Systems Annual Assessment: Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to Sustaining
Recent Positive Trends, available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/691473.pdf.
Among the innumerable charts and assessments of individual programs,
GAO offered a dazzling array of observations and insights. Some of our
favorites included:
•

GAO’s broadest find appears to be that programs that implemented
acquisition strategies to promote competition, including competitive award of contracts, reported decreases in total acquisition cost
estimates as compared to others.

•

DOD’s 2017 portfolio grew both in number of programs (to 86) and
cost (more than $1.66 trillion – we willingly concede that that’s a
lot of money).

•

Programs in DOD’s 2017 portfolio experienced a slight gain in
buying power—meaning DOD is able to buy more goods or services
for the same level of funding.

•

Although the 2017 portfolio experienced more than $535 billion in
cost growth over the original estimates, most of that growth ($464
billion or 86 percent) occurred prior to 2012.

•

The 25 programs (representing 29 percent of the current portfolio)
initiated since 2010 currently demonstrate better cost performance
than older programs. GAO concluded that the acquisition reforms
implemented that year (and later) were a driving factor behind
the cost changes.

•

On a less positive note, most programs did not fully demonstrate
system design stability prior to conducting Critical Design Reviews; none of the programs fully demonstrated manufacturing
processes that were in statistical control prior to starting production; and, for more than a third of the current programs GAO
reviewed, DoD declared, or intend to declare, initial operational
capability on the basis of limited (or no) initial operational test
and evaluation.

In a somewhat related, but arguably broader, study, GAO offered a retrospective on some of the more recent acquisition reforms. See GAO Surveys Acquisition Reforms Over A Decade After SARA Panel, 60 GC ¶ 281, GAO-18-627,
Federal Acquisitions: Congress and the Executive Branch Have Taken Steps
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to Address Key Issues, but Challenges Endure (September 2018), available at
www.gao.gov/assets/700/694457.pdf. Among other things, GAO noted that:
•

Despite questions about the capacity of federal agencies to oversee contractors, agencies continue to award contracts warranting
increased management attention at a steady rate.

•

The federal acquisition workforce faces workload and training
challenges, including workforce gaps at DOD and across agencies.

•

Unrealistic requirements continue to contribute to poor DoD program outcomes; yet, from 2008 to 2017, the Army’s requirements
development workforce decreased by 22 percent.

•

The government’s primary repository for acquisition data contained some unreliable data, and the system has demonstrated
limitations. (More on this, below.)

•

Agencies periodically use bridge contracts that, over time, delay
opportunities for competition and can place the government at
risk of paying higher prices for multiple years.

K. And Don’t Forget Infrastructure. Stepping back from our defense
focus, one of our initial hopes for this administration was a renewal of infrastructure investment, possibly with a greater reliance on public-private
partnerships (PPP’S or P3). Remember when there was talk of a massive
infrastructure infusion – specifically, a campaign promise to invest $550B
to upgrade the nation’s roads, highways, bridges tunnels, railways, airports,
transit systems and ports, and maybe even the electrical grid and public wireless capacity? Obviously, that failed to materialize. Indeed, there has been
little or no discussion about the ever-increasing, and cumulatively cascading,
need to invest in infrastructure (other than the relentless concerns regarding
cyber-security, of course). For a fleeting moment, the bridge disaster in Genoa, Italy, brought the issue back into the public’s consciousness (but, again,
in the current chaotic news cycle, it had no staying power). See, generally,
James Glanz, et al., Genoa Bridge Collapse: The Road to Tragedy, The New
York Times has reconstructed how the disaster happened, from beginning to
end, New York Times (September 6, 2018) (extraordinary long-form reporting and visually appealing, accessible analysis), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/09/06/world/europe/genoa-italy-bridge.html; John Surico,
What Brought Down the Bridge in Italy? A deadly disaster has focused attention on the state of infrastructure built during the country’s postwar boom,
Atlantic (August 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2018/08/what-brought-down-this-bridge-in-genoa/567625/; Ian
Bogost, More Bridges Will Collapse: Two disasters in Europe are the latest
examples of the decline of infrastructure—as an idea as much as a physical
thing, Atlantic (August 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2018/08/the-age-of-precarious-infrastructure/567493/; John Miller,
Restore Nonpartisan Support for Infrastructure, Transport Topics (July 27,
2018) (“It’s time for Congress to challenge itself to change and once again
make infrastructure a nonpartisan issue.”), https://www.ttnews.com/articles/
opinion-restore-nonpartisan-support-infrastructure.
To the extent that GAO has focused on infrastructure, its analysis remains
more micro than macro, more retrospective than prospective. See, e.g., GAO:
Military Should Better Track Contracts Privatizing Utility Systems, 60 GC ¶
282, GAO-18-558, Defense Infrastructure: Guidance Needed to Develop Metrics and Implement Cybersecurity Requirements for Utilities Privatization
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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Contracts, (since 1997, when Congress authorized privatization of utility
systems at military installations, DoD has privatized nearly 600 of about
2,600 utility systems – including electric, water, wastewater, natural gas, and
thermal systems – on military installations), available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/694219.pdf; GAO Questions MILCON Cost Estimate Reliability, 60
GC ¶ 105 (two of the three high-value projects GAO examined experienced a
more than 30-percent increase over initial cost estimates; DOD cost estimators did not follow all the best practices (comprehensive, well-documented,
accurate, and credible) associated with reliable estimating), GAO-18-101,
Defense Infrastructure: Action Needed to Increase the Reliability of Construction Cost Estimates, available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/690892.pdf; and,
for a specific anecdote, see, DOD Needs Guidance To Improve Medical Infrastructure Construction Projects, 60 GC ¶ 193, DODIG-2018-125, The Fort
Bliss Hospital Replacement Military Construction Project, available at media.
defense.gov/2018/Jun/08/2001928750/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-125.PDF.
VI.	IT’S ALL ABOUT PEOPLE: HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE:
We continue to believe that the acquisition workforce is critically important, and we found plenty of interesting insights in this year’s data-rich Federal
Acquisition Institute (FAI) and OFPP 2018 Acquisition Workforce Competency
Survey Report. See, FAI, OFPP Survey Contracting Workforce Competencies,
Demographics, 60 GC ¶ 261; 2018 Acquisition Workforce Competency Survey
Report, available at www.fai.gov/drupal/sites/default/files/2018_Acquisition_Workforce_Competency_Survey_Report.pdf. Ultimately, while much of
this is interesting – and worth discussing – there’s plenty of head-scratching
and disappointing stuff included as well. As for the big picture:
The highest-rated competencies were:
•

Among FAC-C (Contracting) holders: issuing changes, awarding
contracts, and competition;

•

Among FAC-COR (Contracting Officer’s Representative) holders:
inspection and acceptance and business acumen and communication.

•

Among FAC-P/PM (Program and Project Managers) holders: leadership.

The lowest proficiency ratings were:
•

For FAC-C holders: negotiating forward pricing rates agreements,
as well as contracting in contingency or combat settings.

•

For FAC-COR holders: pre-award communication and contract
negotiation.

•

For FAC-P/PM holders: systems engineering.

The data represents a robust, but nonetheless, surprisingly limited,
sampling of the workforce. A total of 36,836 responses (a significantly larger
response rate than the FY16 survey) included 25,562 complete survey responses. As for coverage:
• The survey did not include the Defense Department, which represents
the lion’s share of the annual procurement budget;
• The highest response rates were the Department of Labor (almost
35%), the Small Business Administration (31%), the Department of the
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Interior (29%), the Department of Education (27%), and the Department of
Agriculture (27%); yet
• The agencies with the largest number of FAC responses – all with
less than 27 percent reporting – were the Department of Veterans Affairs
(2,568), the Department of Homeland Security (2,325), and the Department
of Health and Human Services (1,912).
Moreover, if there’s a fundamental flaw in the data, it’s that respondents
self-rated their own level of proficiency. (But, hey, it is what it is: a survey.)
More troubling was the observation that a plurality of FAC holders dedicates
0–25% of their time to acquisition-related activities. (Frankly, we’re not terribly interested in knowing the competence level of the folks who aren’t doing the work. Although, hypothetically, it’s nice to know that there is depth
on the bench, in case we need to call on it at some point.) The demographic
information was also interesting:
• The most common paygrade, the GS-13 level, represents 28.7% of
FAC holders, yet the most common category of years of acquisition experience was only 6–10 years. (Does this mean that the more senior acquisition
professionals were too busy, or too jaded, to complete the survey?)
• The most common age category among FAC holders was 51–55 years,
with millennials accounting for 11.3% of the acquisition workforce. (Again,
given the response rate, we’re hesitant to conclude that we’re working with
a representative sample of the actual workforce.)
In addition, earlier in the year, GAO concluded that DoD could do more
to optimize the program management career field and community.
The military services recognize that they need skilled program
managers to develop acquisition programs and have taken steps to
develop that top-notch talent. ...
Yet, [despite a solid training regimen, establishment of professional
standards, and sharing of lessons learned] when compared to
leading practices, we found that several practices used by the
military services for training, mentoring, retaining, and selecting
people for program manager positions could be improved….
In nearly all cases, the military services could improve their
practices by learning from ideas and initiatives being used by
another military service or by commercial companies and ensuring
that civilian and military personnel have similar opportunities to
develop.

GAO-18-217, Defense Acquisition Workforce: Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices for Developing Program Managers (February 2018), available
at www.gao.gov/assets/700/690094.pdf; DOD Can Improve Development Of
Acquisition Program Managers, 60 GC ¶ 59 (among other things, GAO said
the Air Force could improve its retention and selection practices; the Army
could improve training, mentoring, and retention; and the Navy, which merited
special attention, has “practices that do not extensively align with leading
practices in each of the areas of training, mentoring, retaining, and selecting
program managers”).
VII. PROCUREMENT DATA: BETTER GRAPHICS, SAME DATA?
A. Data Crunching the Federal Procurement Spend. In a break
from (longstanding) tradition, the Chapter does not offer a detailed report of
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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last fiscal year’s procurement and grant spending. We expect that, as more
fulsome data becomes available, FY2018 will reflect mixed results, initially
slowed by continuing resolutions (CR’s) and uncertainty, with a frantic rush
at the end of the fiscal year (FY), but, overall, less spending than in FY2017.
FY2019, of course, is off to an uneven start with many agencies fully funded,
while others are bogged down by appropriations paralysis.
B. Test Driving the New “Data Lab.” We were intrigued by USASpending.gov’s new DataLab (still in Beta), which offers a broad range of
eye-catching graphics and insights. For example, the DataLab graphically
illustrates that, in FY 2017, over 60 percent of federal contract dollars were
competitively awarded through 21,858,521 competitive actions (representing
$320 billion), as compared to 925,888 non-competitive actions (representing
$190 billion). (If we understand the data, that suggests that noncompetitive
procurements tend to be significantly larger than their competitive siblings.
We also assume, of course, that the data excludes, among other things, millions of micro-purchase transactions.)
For our purposes, there was much of interest in the section: Contract
Spending Analysis: How has federal contract spending changed over time?,
see https://datalab.usaspending.gov/contracts-over-time.html. The DataLab
shows, over the past ten years:
•

a slow increase from $470B in federal procurement spending in
FY 2007, to a peak of $560B in FY2010;

•

a steady decrease from FY2011 to a low of $440B in FY 2015;

•

an short-term upward trend, with FY 2016 at $470B and FY 2017
at $510B; and, unfortunately

•

only partial data (a round $200B) for FY 2018 (as of March 31,
excluding, of course, the end-of-year binge in August and September 2018).

One of the most entertaining graphics reflects the distribution of contracts
awarded over the course of the fiscal year.
• While no one should be surprised that the last two weeks of September
are the highest (and represent significant outliers on the chart), the chart
also indicates that “spending tended to rise and fall on a monthly cadence,
with roughly one small peak and one small drop per month.” Frankly, we
have no idea what to make of this. And, while we’re not surprised that the
last week of December and the first week of January represent the two least
active weeks of the year, we can’t explain why the first week of April is the
most active week outside the month of September.
• Moreover, “the end-of-year spikes consistently occurred across the
decade, and … [o]n average[,] September spikes accounted for between 6-8
percent of the annual spending in a fiscal year.”
• At the same time, we thought it made perfect sense that “[m]odifications … displayed less variance and did not spike as drastically at the end of
each fiscal year. This suggests that new contracts—not modifications—drove
the spikes at the end of each fiscal year.”
• The data suggests that “Facilities, Equipment, and Construction
[contracts] displayed about 3.5 times the level of variance over the decade
as total contract spending, and over 50 times the variance of spending on
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Weapons and Ammunition … [which] did not spike at the end of the fiscal
year.” [Emphasis added.]
• “[R]esearch and development [R&D] spending was less variable and
less impacted by continuing resolutions….” The DataLab team ruminated
that, “[a]s one of the smallest categories of spending, it is possible that this
type of contract is partially sheltered from the timing of congressional appropriations.”
• Given current events, it’s worth noting that “the passage of a continuing resolution increased total contract spending by 25 percent in the same week,
all else held equal. [Conversely,] passage of new appropriations resulted in
a decrease in total contract spending of 30 percent in the same week, all else
held equal.... [Of course, that makes sense, because, i]f agencies are unable
to issue new contracts because adequate funds are not available under continuing resolutions, needs accumulate, and then are satisfied once funding is
available.” [Emphasis added.]
C. Consume Your Data With A Grain of Salt. Despite the splendid
graphical presentations provided by the Department of Treasury on the
USASpending.gov website, concerns remain with the accuracy and currency
of the underlying data in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).
Agencies Underreported Federal IT Acquisitions, Did Not Obtain Required
CIO Approval, GAO Finds, 60 GC ¶ 10 (“most agencies did not identify all
of their information technology contracts, and eight failed to identify over
40 percent of their IT contract obligations” (emphasis added)); GAO-18-42,
Information Technology: Agencies Need to Involve Chief Information Officers
in Reviewing Billions of Dollars in Acquisitions, available at www.gao.gov/
assets/690/689346.pdf; Inaccurate Procurement Data Undermine SBA’s
Contract Reporting, IG Says, 60 GC ¶ 328, www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
oig/SBA-OIG-Report-19-01.pdf; SBA Small Business Procurement Scorecard
Methodology Needs Further Revisions, 60 GC ¶ 310; GAO-18-672, Small
Business Administration: Actions Needed to Improve Confidence in Small
Business Procurement Scorecard (September 2018) (GAO recommended that
SBA design and implement a comprehensive evaluation to assess scorecard
revisions, and institute a process for reviewing scorecards for accuracy prior
to publication and a mechanism for disclosing corrected information.), available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/694777.pdf; POGO Offers Recommendations
to Improve USAspending.gov, https://www.pogo.org/letter/2018/06/pogooffers-recommendations-to-improve-usaspendinggov/ (8 of 97 agencies are
late (including DoD, almost a year behind) in reporting DATA Act spending
information; other government programs have submitted very few spending
records or none), see also https://about.bgov.com/blog/federal-spendingsite-still-lacks-data-revamp-report-says/. Nor is the data set keeping up
with the rapidly evolving global open data standards. See GAO-19-72, Open
Data: Treasury Could Better Align USAspending.gov with Key Practices and
Search Requirements (December 2018), available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/700/696023.pdf.
Meanwhile, the service contract inventory exercise continues, apparently satisfying no one. DOD Still Not Using Service Contracts Inventory
To Inform Decision-Making, 60 GC ¶ 115 (GAO noted that military services
generally have no plans to use the contract services inventory to inform
management and budget decisions, although 10 USCA § 2330a(e), requires
them to do so), GAO-18-330, DOD Contracted Services: Long-Standing Issues
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Remain about Using Inventory for Management Decisions, available at www.
gao.gov/assets/700/690954.pdf. In addition to others, PSC has advocated
eliminating the inventories because, among other things, service contract
inventory reporting has produced limited value for the significant amount
of effort required of contractors and related work required of agencies. See
59 GC ¶ 254.
D. Comparing the Costs of Contractor and Government Personnel. On a related note, we now have more data that reminds us that no one
has (yet) proven that contractors are more (or less) expensive than government personnel, in large part because no one has created a reliable, verifiable algorithm or tool to, in effect, compare apples to oranges. DOD noted
that, although the results were not generalizable across DoD, “for the 21,000
federal civilians and service contractors compared, neither federal civilians
nor service contractors were predominately more or less expensive, with the
costs being dependent upon the function being performed, location, and level
of expertise.” That conclusion should surprise no one. GAO subsequently assessed DOD’s report and determined that DoD’s analysis addressed most of
the elements in Congress’ request for the assessment. DOD Workforce Cost
Comparison Report Addresses Congressional Request, GAO Finds, 60 GC ¶
140; GAO-18-399, Civilian and Contractor Workforces: DOD’s Cost Comparisons Addressed Most Report Elements but Excluded Some Costs (April 2018),
available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/691305.pdf.
VIII.	OPTIMISM AMID ADVERSITY? STORM CLOUDS OR
SILVER LINING?
Regular attendees know that this review has consistently and prominently featured the Professional Services Council Acquisition Policy Surveys of acquisition experts and leaders, which, for more than fifteen years,
have collected “opinions and insights from federal government acquisition
leaders on the current state of the acquisition profession, the impact of
policy initiatives, noteworthy trends, and future challenges and opportunities.” The 2018 survey, true to form, is instructive, primarily because it
includes the opinion of a broad and experienced cross-section of knowledgeable practitioners (from both the government and the private sector).
Optimism Amid Adversity, The 9th Biennial Professional Services Council
Acquisition Policy Survey (July 2018), available from PSC, at https://www.
pscouncil.org/__p/cr/r/2016AcquisitionPolicySurvey.aspx. Some of the
key findings include:
Budget. Even before the most recent counter-productive (yet, admittedly,
only partial) government shut-down, far more than half of those surveyed
expressed concern that budget conditions had deteriorated since 2016 (which,
incidentally, marks the most precipitous decline since PSC began the survey).
Respondents also bemoaned the inability to plan, with continuing resolutions
(CRs), government shutdowns, and shifting spending caps injecting volatility
into the budget cycle and, of course, compressing acquisition timelines.
Acquisition Workforce. If you are reading these materials, we do not
need to convince you that successful contracting outcomes depend upon people.
Unfortunately, respondents identified certain skill areas that continue to be
lacking across the workforce, including developing requirements, buying “as
a service,” negotiation, and critical thinking. Moreover, it’s no surprise that,
since 2016, hiring challenges have increased and are exacerbated by, among
other things, budget instability and hiring freezes, which, of course, cumula-
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tively make it difficult to keep up with the pace and volume of change (and,
of course, stifle innovation, but more on that, below).
Innovation. Respondents expressed concern that innovation is not well
understood and was stifled by, among other things, fear of oversight (or protests). Although respondents were optimistic about other transactions (see
above) and innovation laboratories, many still feared that the burdensome
regulatory environment dissuaded to many innovative companies from doing
business with the government.
Oversight and compliance. Consistent with prior surveys, respondents
pointed to the cumulative impact of frequently changing policies as detrimental to acquisition outcomes. High on the irritation and frustration scale were
labor-related requirements, audits, and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS)
compliance. Those surveyed found GAO audits and OMB guidance generally valuable and, while they were divided on whether past performance was
useful, they tended to agree that congressional oversight was less valuable.
Communication and collaboration. A longstanding source of frustration - think back to the Dan Gordon-era OFPP myth-busters campaign – provided a source of optimism and potential improvements – particularly with
regard to enhanced debriefings and reverse industry days (RID’s). Nonetheless,
failure to communicate still, too often, impeded the achievement of successful
acquisition outcomes (and created barriers to entry).
IX. LAUGHTER THE BEST MEDICINE?
In case you missed it, we’re recommending you make time for our favorite (short) document of the year. See Defense Innovation Board (DIB): DIB
Guide: Detecting Agile BS (Version 0.4, last modified 3 Oct 2018 – WORKING DOCUMENT//DRAFT), available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/
Oct/09/2002049591/-1/-1/0/DIB_DETECTING_AGILE_BS_2018.10.05.
PDF. Beginning from the premise that: “Agile is a buzzword of software
development, and so all DoD software development projects are, almost by
default, now declared to be “agile[,]” the document is rich with valuable insights, recommendations, and quips, such as:
Key flags that a project is not really agile [include]: Nobody on
the software development team is talking with and observing the
users of the software in action; we mean the actual users of the
actual code. (The Program Executive Office (PEO) does not count
as an actual user, nor does the commanding officer, unless she uses
the code.) A footnote elaborates that “Acceptable substitutes for
talking to users: Observing users working, putting prototypes in
front of them for feedback, and other aspects of user research that
involve less talking.” . . . .
Questions for Program Management [include]: How many
programmers are part of the organizations that owns the budget
and milestones for the program? (Wrong answers: “we don’t know,”
“zero,” “it depends on how you define a programmer”)

See also, Kevin McCaney, Defense Innovation Board Issues Guide to
‘Detecting Agile BS’: Industry experts advise government agencies to weed
out the fakes, (October 19, 2018), at https://www.governmentciomedia.com/
defense-innovation-board-issues-guide-detecting-agile-bs (The document
“aims to help Department of Defense officials separate the bona fide from
the buzz.... Among the guide’s red flags that the agile claim is not authentic
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is that users are kept out of the loop.... For the DIB, the problem isn’t with
agile, it’s with those who say they’re using an agile approach in order to score
points with the people holding the purse strings, but aren’t delivering the
goods.”). See also, DOD IG Questions Air Force’s Agile Software Development
For F-22 Modernization, 60 GC ¶ 116, DODIG-2018-089, Contracting Strategy
for F-22 Modernization (“Agile has historically only been used for software
development and has not previously been used for hardware development on
DoD weapon systems…. The use of agile across DoD is increasing, and it is
imperative that DoD address the use of methodologies like agile by updating
acquisition guidance.” IG also noted that a contracting strategy for scaled
agile framework was not identified; nor was there sufficient DoD policy for
implementing agile software development methods), available at media.
defense.gov/2018/Mar/26/2001894248/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-089.PDF.
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